Caesar 6X6 for Armenia: A Compromise Between Effectiveness, Availability, and Political Risk
13.10.2025
General Samvel Babayan (Commander of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army, 1992–1999) recently criticized the decision to purchase the French Caesar 6×6 self-propelled howitzers for the needs of the Armed Forces of Armenia, pointing to a number of technical and tactical shortcomings compared with other systems available on the market. In the general’s view, the French Caesar (155/52) is inferior in some respects to other modern counterparts.
Main arguments: a limited maximum elevation angle of +66°, which can reduce the effectiveness of fire when conducting combat in mountainous terrain, especially in the complex relief conditions characteristic of Armenia; and a crew size of 5–6 people, which requires more trained personnel and complicates operation under conditions of limited human resources.
Samvel Babayan notes that preferable alternatives could be:
The Swedish Archer 155/52 — a fully automated system and, as a result, a higher rate of fire, with a crew of 3 and high mobility.
The Serbian Nora B-52 155/52 — also equipped with an automatic loader, mobile, and requiring fewer service personnel.
However, this position has its weaknesses. First, the French Caesar, equipped with a semi-automatic loading system and lacking an armored turret, has already proven effective in real combat conditions, in particular in Ukraine, Mali and Iraq. The system has a good reputation as a reliable and field-tested solution, delivering accurate and sustained fire at ranges beyond 40 km.
Тhe French Caesar 6×6 is more compact than the Swedish and Serbian counterparts. It is shorter, narrower and much lighter, which ensures better maneuverability and ease of transport along narrow and, most importantly, mountainous roads compared with the Swedish and Serbian howitzers. At the same time, the Swedish and Serbian systems are compensated by the advantage of a fully automatic loading system, which gives a higher rate of fire and a minimal required artillery crew.
For the Caesar 6×6 the standard crew is usually listed as 5 people (sometimes 6): a gunner, two loaders, a firer and a driver. But technical reviews also mention the possibility of operating the howitzer with a minimal crew of 3 or 4 people.
Samvel Babayan’s argument is quite fair on the issue of the elevation-angle difference between the Caesar (+66°) and the Archer (+70°). For the Nora B-52 this parameter is even lower than Caesar’s, at +65°. This difference gives Archer a real tactical advantage when firing on a high trajectory at nearby or high-elevation targets in mountainous terrain. But for most routine tasks the difference is not critical.
If the operational environment constantly requires “high-trajectory” firing, then a higher elevation angle is a significant plus. If tasks are varied (mixed terrain, long-distance firing positions), then a 4° difference does not justify rejecting a tested, reliable system like the Caesar.
In addition, it is important to consider that Armenia will supplement its wheeled SPG fleet with systems capable of high-trajectory fire. In particular, the MArG (4×4, 155/39) SPGs being acquired from India, with a firing range of 24 km, have an elevation angle of +72°, which gives them better capability for that type of fire on reverse slopes and in high-mountain terrain. This will allow compensation for the French howitzer’s limitation in elevation through combined use of artillery platforms: both for long-range and stable positions, and for “high-trajectory” fire at short distances and in difficult terrain.
Second, the alternatives to the French howitzer that the general references come with a number of constraints. When choosing an SPG it is important to consider not only the maximum elevation angle in the technical specifications and the profile of the envisaged combat operations, but also its availability.
The production capacity of BAE Systems Bofors in Sweden is extremely limited, and the entire production output of Archer howitzers is being allocated to the needs of Sweden, the United Kingdom and supplies to Ukraine. Archer is also considered part of the European program to strengthen Ukrainian artillery. All new vehicles are being delivered under this initiative — Sweden and BAE Systems Bofors state this explicitly in press releases.
Therefore, supplies to Armenia in the foreseeable future are unlikely. Even if Armenia expressed interest and had the financial means, delivery of Archer from a production and political perspective is hardly possible.
Serbia, despite having export potential and possibly an attractive price (Azerbaijan is buying 48 Nora B-52 howitzers for €339 million, which amounts to about €7 million per unit), presents a political risk.
Azerbaijan is a strategic partner of Serbia and one of the significant investors in the Serbian economy. Belgrade has already faced diplomatic pressure after past arms sales to Armenia. In July 2020, deliveries of Serbian mortars to Armenia caused protracted explanations and apologies from the Serbian leadership to Baku. The head of Serbia’s Security Council was sent to Baku to smooth things over and discuss the concerns of Azerbaijani partners. Many senior Serbian officials, both current and former, expressed regret over the use of Serbian-made weapons by Armenia and the deaths of Azerbaijani servicemen.
Under current conditions, repeating such a scenario — but this time with long-range self-propelled howitzers — is unlikely. That is, unless Azerbaijan were to give Serbia a “green light” to sell artillery systems to Armenia.
Despite the justified technical criticism (on elevation angle + automatic loading), the choice of Caesar 6×6 for Armenia appears to be a rational compromise between quality, availability and political realism.
The French system is not perfect in some parameters, but it is proven and supported by a defense partner ready to provide political and technical backing. Under these conditions Caesar remains the most balanced and realistic option for strengthening Armenia’s artillery capabilities.
Eduard Arakelyan
Regional Center for Democracy and Security
The article was originally published on Civilnet.