Government Support Programs for Nagorno-Karabakh Refugees in 2025: Assessment and Recommendations
Main Support Programs
In 2025, the support programs for residents forcibly displaced from Artsakh underwent changes. The largest mid-term program, which provided compensation for rent and utility expenses under the formula of 40,000 + 10,000 AMD, was significantly revised. As of April 1, 2025, the composition of beneficiaries changed: instead of all refugees without housing, beneficiaries now included forcibly displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh who have Group I or II disabilities, severe or profound functional limitations, persons aged 63 and older, individuals receiving survivor’s benefits or pensions due to the loss of a breadwinner, persons aged 18 and over studying in general education institutions, primary vocational (craft) or secondary vocational education institutions, as well as children under the age of 18. The amount provided to them was reduced first from 40,000 and then to a total of 30,000 AMD. The program operated until the end of 2025. One of the informal justifications for restricting the 40+10 thousand AMD program was the argument that rent compensation hinders progress in the housing provision program and that forcibly displaced persons with guaranteed rent compensation are not in a hurry to acquire citizenship and take advantage of the housing program.
Throughout 2025, the housing provision program that had started in mid-2024 also continued. This program envisages support of 2–5 million AMD per family member of a displaced family, depending on the locality in Armenia where the housing is purchased. The government also defined a list of localities eligible for 3, 4, and 5 million AMD, which was revised during the year to include several important settlements, including regional centers such as Ijevan, Vanadzor, Gyumri, Hrazdan, Armavir, as well as other cities such as Charentsavan, Echmiadzin, Byureghavan, and others. The amount was increased to 4 million AMD. These changes, as well as the reduction of the rent compensation program, accelerated the growth in the number of families receiving housing purchase certificates. To obtain a certificate, all family members had to (once again) acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia. As of December 15, 2025, under the state housing provision program, around 1,600 forcibly displaced Artsakh families had purchased housing over a period of 1.5 years, while the number of potential beneficiaries reaches up to 30,000 families. This program is particularly problematic for small families. In 2025, an amendment was introduced allowing members of one-, two-, and three-person families with at least one family member aged 60 or older to receive monthly compensation of 40,000 AMD for ten years instead of a housing purchase certificate. To implement the housing provision program, the RA government decided to attract loan funds. It nevertheless failed to convene an international donors’ conference to mobilize friendly countries around addressing this sensitive issue.
In addition to the housing problem, displaced citizens particularly point to the lack of employment opportunities and access to borrowed funds for starting their own businesses (given that people who have lost everything generally do not have collateral). All of this was identified as a result of discussions with local leaders of Artsakh (heads of districts and communities). The results of in-depth research were presented to decision-making bodies of the Republic of Armenia. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Republic of Armenia had developed an employment program that envisaged vocational training and job placement, acquisition of work experience and subsequent employment. It included compensation for three months of training fees and a three-month stipend, as well as compensation to employers who hire beneficiaries in the amount of taxes and other payments for a certain period. In 2025, around 700 people became beneficiaries of this program, but it is unclear how many continue to work after the funding period ends; observations show that turnover among those employed through this program is high.
On December 25, 2025, the government adopted a self-employment promotion program for forcibly displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh, aimed at stabilizing beneficiaries economically through the promotion of entrepreneurial activity. Although the program will cover a limited number of people (an estimated 200 beneficiaries, according to the government), since only those who have received housing purchase certificates and have been unemployed for at least the last three months will be considered beneficiaries, they must also complete a relatively long training course, after which they may partially receive a grant of up to 2 million AMD to engage in entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, creating a program specifically for the forcibly displaced population that promotes entrepreneurship is a welcome initiative.
This year, the government continued compensating tuition fees for Artsakh students, including 240 first-year students admitted to universities and colleges this year. Students who fail to meet a certain academic performance threshold are subsequently deprived of this support.
Summarizing the programs implemented by the RA government in 2025 for persons forcibly displaced from Artsakh, it can be noted that there is a gradual transition toward a single main long-term program—the housing provision program. The mid-term rent compensation program is being restricted and is gradually moving toward elimination (it is possible that, due to the pre-election period, the program may be extended for another year). The timid programs aimed at promoting employment and supporting entrepreneurship still lack wide coverage and impact. More than 27 months after the forced displacement from Artsakh, the main problems of the forcibly displaced persons remain housing provision, employment, and the inaccessibility of borrowed funds for engaging in entrepreneurship.
A Critical Look at the Logic and Effectiveness of the Programs
During 2025, a clear shift can be observed in the RA government’s policy from social assistance toward “regulated integration,” with the housing provision program placed at its core. However, this transition is being carried out unilaterally, without public, political, or institutional discussion with the forcibly displaced population.
The informal justifications for reducing the rent compensation program (failure to accept citizenship, slowing of the housing provision program) point not to beneficiaries’ irresponsibility, but to weak incentives between programs.
Instead of revising the logic of the programs, the government chose the path of limiting social assistance, which may accelerate certain indicators in the short term but deepens distrust toward the state in the long run.
The housing provision program has effectively become the only long-term state policy around which all other decisions are built. However, the program has a number of structural problems: it is more suitable for large families; small families and single individuals face a choice between inefficient investment or exclusion from the program; the mandatory citizenship requirement is politically understandable but socially insensitive, especially for people who still have certain fears or issues of legal uncertainty. Moreover, people found themselves in this situation as a result of an arbitrary decision by the RA government—that is, individuals who had always been considered RA citizens were deemed non-citizens overnight and subjected to a procedure to (again) become citizens. It should also be taken into account that under another similar RA government program—the state program “Housing Provision for Families Displaced from Certain Regions of Nagorno-Karabakh”—a mandatory citizenship requirement is not specified. Consequently, the new housing provision program also contains a discriminatory approach in this respect.
In addition, the program is being implemented through loan funds, while the government has failed to engage international donors around a comprehensive policy package. This raises the question of whether housing provision is viewed as an international humanitarian issue or exclusively as an internal social burden of the Republic of Armenia. This approach often gives rise to anti-Artsakh sentiments, subconsciously instilling the idea that Armenian society is making sacrifices to solve the problems of Artsakh Armenians. This approach is further reinforced in the speeches of high-ranking RA officials, including the prime minister, where the increase in Armenia’s public debt is attributed to expenditures on the army and on Artsakh Armenians.
The employment promotion program has recorded certain quantitative results, but its qualitative effectiveness remains uncertain. High job turnover indicates that the program often fails to address real problems related to low wages, professional mismatch, and high turnover after the program ends. The program resembles a short-term activation measure more than a policy of sustainable integration.
The self-employment promotion program is conceptually correct, but its circle of beneficiaries is extremely limited. In practice, it is accessible only to people who have already managed to overcome several obstacles or meet numerous conditions (citizenship, housing certificate, unemployed status).
This creates the risk that the most vulnerable groups will once again be left without support, while entrepreneurship is viewed not as a tool for social recovery but as a “reward” for those who are already relatively stable.
Another major shortcoming is decision-making without meaningful participation. From the outset, decisions regarding persons forcibly displaced from Artsakh were made without discussions with various groups of Artsakh Armenians. While in the last quarter of 2023 the RA government had some contacts with official representatives of Artsakh, after ensuring that “transitional phase,” such engagement is no longer observed. Very often, consultations are merely demonstrative, formally providing a veneer of participation. Changes to programs have frequently been made only after public pressure or repeated criticism of illogical aspects of the programs.
Recommendations
The implementation of the housing provision program should not lead to a sharp reduction in social assistance. Rent compensation should not be eliminated but transformed, linking it to progress in housing provision, setting time-bound but flexible transitional phases, and allowing partial combination.
A separate package should be developed for single individuals and small families, such as social housing or a community housing fund.
Employment programs should prioritize long-term outcomes. The state should measure not only the number of participants, but also job retention after 6 and 12 months, wage levels, and social security.
Alongside the self-employment program, it is necessary to establish a system of state-guaranteed microloans without collateral requirements.
Another crucial point is that Artsakh Armenians must participate in policy decisions that concern them. Support programs should be developed not only for them, but together with them, through advisory bodies, permanent dialogue, and participatory mechanisms.
Hayk Khanumyan