Iran’s Kharg Island as a Target of Military Operations: Risks of War Escalation
26.03.2026
Since February 28, the United States and Israel have been carrying out continuous strikes on Iranian territory. In response, Iran has been using its available arsenal to strike Israel and the infrastructure of U.S. military bases in the region. These actions have also led to restrictions on navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, causing a rise in energy prices and demonstrating Iran’s ability to influence global oil supplies.
The United States has begun considering alternative ways to increase pressure on Tehran after initial attempts to force Iran’s capitulation proved ineffective. In U.S. expert and political circles, a scenario involving the seizure of Iran’s Kharg Island—a key oil terminal through which the majority of Iran’s oil exports pass—is being discussed. However, such an operation involves serious risks and significant limitations at both the operational and strategic levels.
Strategic importance of Kharg Island
Kharg Island is the most critical element of Iran’s oil infrastructure. Up to 90% of Iran’s oil exports pass through its terminals, making it one of the country’s key economic hubs. Geographically, the island is located in the Persian Gulf, about 25 km from Iran’s coast, allowing Tehran to rapidly deploy forces and equipment there.
Control over Kharg could be viewed as a tool of economic pressure aimed at reducing Iran’s oil revenues. However, in the context of a full-scale conflict, economic leverage has limited effectiveness—especially given that Iran perceives the war as a struggle for state survival.
Capturing the island would require an amphibious landing operation, one of the most complex forms of assault. Successfully carrying out such a mission would require the involvement of substantial forces, including marines, airborne units, aviation, naval forces, and logistical support.
According to reports, more than 5,000 U.S. Marines, accompanied by rapid response groups and several thousand troops from an airborne division, are already being deployed to the Middle East. The buildup of expeditionary forces of this scale suggests the formation of a mobile strike grouping. Under these conditions, the likelihood of a transition from remote strikes to a ground operation is assessed as increasing, although troop deployments alone do not necessarily mean an invasion is inevitable and may also serve as a form of pressure and demonstration of force.
Operational options
An amphibious assault from the sea is considered the riskiest option, as U.S. ships would have to enter the Persian Gulf and operate in a confined maritime space saturated with anti-ship threats. Iran has the capability to mine the waters and deploy coastal missile systems, drones, and suicide boats. Under such conditions, a naval landing would likely only be feasible after neutralizing these threats.
A helicopter landing reduces risks to naval vessels but makes transport helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft vulnerable to air defense systems, missiles, and drones. An airborne operation is theoretically the most viable option, as it allows for rapid deployment of forces onto the island, but it requires full control of the airspace and reliable suppression of Iranian air defenses.
In all scenarios, the operation would require significant resources and high levels of coordination between different branches of the military. Additionally, the element of surprise would be limited, as preparations for an operation of this scale would inevitably become known to Iran.
Iran’s military capabilities
A key factor complicating the operation for U.S. forces is the island’s proximity to mainland Iran. This would allow Iranian forces to quickly deploy reinforcements and use rocket artillery, short-range missiles, and drone systems.
Over recent decades, Iran has focused on developing asymmetric military capabilities, including coastal missile systems, drones, naval mines, small attack boats, rocket artillery, and short-range air defense systems.
This structure is designed for active defensive operations in coastal areas and to complicate the actions of a more technologically advanced adversary. In the event of a ground confrontation, Iran has an advantage in supply and force deployment. The contingent on the island could be reinforced in advance by units from the mainland, creating the risk of a prolonged battle for control.
Risks of holding the island
The main challenge lies not only in capturing the island but also in holding it over time, which would require constant resupply and rotation of forces. The island’s limited territory, surrounded by water, makes any deployed forces dependent on sea and air supply lines. Any disruption in logistics could significantly worsen the situation.
Iran could employ a strategy of sustained pressure, including missile strikes, drone attacks, artillery shelling, and maritime operations aimed at isolating the island.
This raises the risk of further escalation of the conflict onto mainland Iran. At present, the United States and Israel have already been conducting strikes for more than 20 days on coastal areas, military bases, air defense facilities, and suspected missile positions. Any threat to U.S. forces—which would be almost inevitable after seizing the island—would require expanding operations to secure troops, logistics, and potentially evacuation.
Thus, holding the island could lead to an expansion of hostilities onto mainland Iran, turning a landing operation into a full-scale ground campaign.
Iran possesses significant ground force manpower (approximately 350,000 regular army personnel and 190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fighters, not including reserves), along with a territorial defense system.
Iran’s advantages lie in its combination of vast territory, large mobilization potential, experience in asymmetric operations, and active use of missile and drone systems, supported by the proximity of its own supply lines.
The presence of both a significant Iranian military contingent and civilian population on the island could turn the operation into urban combat, greatly increasing risks for the attacking side. Beyond purely military challenges, an assault and subsequent blockade of the island would inevitably lead to severe humanitarian consequences.
From the standpoint of economic pressure, seizing the oil terminal alone does not guarantee the achievement of strategic goals, as in conditions of intense warfare, economic pressure becomes secondary to immediate military objectives.
Conclusion
The seizure of Kharg Island is technically feasible. However, even a highly successful assault would require enormous resources, and holding it would be constrained by vulnerable logistics and Iranian resistance. An attempt to entrench forces on the island could escalate into a prolonged ground campaign on the mainland, potentially involving not only the United States and Israel but also certain NATO countries and the armed forces of Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf.
Eduard Arakelyan
RCDS
The article was originally published on Civilnet.