Key Features of Iranian Protests and Their Potential Impact on Armenia
29.01.2026
Protests in Iran’s History
In Iran, any protest, in the field of analysis — both Iranian and international — becomes an occasion for two main narratives: “The protests are about social, economic, and individual freedoms, but they are not against the Islamic Republic,” and, “The protests are about social, economic, and individual freedoms as a pretext, the main dissatisfaction is with the Islamic Republic regime itself.” Authors of the second narrative usually explicitly state in their analyses: “The Iranian regime is on the verge of collapse.”
Both interpretations contain a grain of truth. First, because, regardless of the cause of the protests, the ranks of demonstrators are never uniform, and it is always possible to find those who are concerned with social issues, those who fight for individual freedoms, and those who believe that the above-mentioned issues cannot be resolved within the current political system. At the same time, it is natural that any protest occurring in Iran immediately finds supporters outside the country — in the Iranian diaspora as well as in American and Israeli analytical circles. Alongside the opportunities provided by technologies and the internet, the participation of people with oppositional political views from the Iranian diaspora in domestic Iranian political processes has also increased. Considering that a significant part of the diaspora formed from people who left the country after the Islamic Revolution for political, security, and economic reasons, there are many among them who are supporters of regime change. In American and Israeli analytical and political circles, because the advocacy of solving the “Iranian question” through regime change has long been widespread, each protest provides an opportunity to form a new wave of this advocacy.
Protests are an inseparable part of Iran’s contemporary history and a form of dissent characteristic of Iranian political culture. The history of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also full of protests for various issues. The very first of them occurred immediately after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, when the newly formed republic adopted the “law on hijab.” Many women who had participated in the revolution felt deceived by the adoption of this law and went out to the streets demanding its repeal.
The next major wave of protests was the 1999 student protests, which began against the decision to close a reformist newspaper and in support of the political policies of the reformist president at the time, Mohammad Khatami. After the 2009 elections, when citizens who had voted for the reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi protested the victory attributed to the acting president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, protests occurred. The main slogan of the formed “Green Movement” was the question, “Where is my vote?”, which indicated that the protesters considered the political system legitimate but contested the transparency of its electoral system. Following these protests, both Mousavi and his wife Zahra Rahnavard, as well as supporters Mehdi Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami, were placed under house arrest and had restrictions on their freedom of speech.
Protests also occurred in 2017, 2018, and 2019, all motivated by economic reasons but all including a component of political protest. The protests in 2020 followed the killing of General Soleimani and the Iranian authorities’ accidental shooting of a plane flying Iran-Ukraine, and the dissatisfaction was directed both against poor governance and the initial attempt to conceal the mistake. In other words, it was another rupture in trust toward the authorities. The largest wave of recent protests, however, was the 2022 protests, which followed the killing of Mahsa Amini and carried the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom.”
What was different this time
The cause of the protests that began at the end of December 2025 was the next sharp devaluation of the country’s national currency, the rial. But this event occurred in a context where the country, under severe economic crises, had waged a 12-day war against Israel and the United States, suffered serious damage in the nuclear sector — a sector in which massive investments had been made over the years at the expense of other sectors. This also occurred in a context where, over the previous two years, Iran’s partners in the Shiite Crescent of the Middle East had either lost power or largely lost the resources necessary for resistance. Iran had also spent billions of dollars over the years for the needs of these allies of the “Axis of Resistance,” at the expense of many underdeveloped infrastructures in the country, key resources including water, a serious shortage of employment, and growing poverty. Added to this was the issue of thousands of people executed, connected both with participation in protests in recent years and with the “hunt for ghosts” that began as a result of the 2025 military actions.
According to Iran historian Yervand Abrahamyan, protests in Iran have a chance of success if the “Bazaar” — the Iranian market, which is considered one of the most important social supports of the authorities — joins them. The Islamic Revolution is one of the proofs of this assertion. The protests that began at the end of 2025 started in Tehran’s Bazaar, which can be considered one of the main features of this wave and an additional argument that even the most loyal social layer of the political system demands change.
Neither the chants of “Death to the dictator” nor “Long live the Shah” were new for Iranian protests, and their presence alone is still not a sufficient indicator to draw conclusions about the uniformity of the protesters or a single attitude toward the Iranian prince Reza Pahlavi living in the United States. But the novelty this time on this topic was that the prince tried to take on a guiding role from the very first days of the protests, and the majority of protesters followed his calls regarding gathering at specific locations and times. This indicated that, if not as the future head of the country, then at least as a unifying leader of the protests, he could play a role.
Another feature was that the protests included almost all provinces (ostans), and they occurred not only in large cities but also in medium and small towns and rural-urban settlements. If we trust theorists of revolutions and also consider the fact that Iran’s Supreme Leader is 86 years old and has been ill for years, the described situations cover almost all prerequisites for a new revolution. The only missing prerequisite was the presence of division within the ruling regime.
The fact that the government, led by President Pezeshkian, tried to find ways of dialogue with the protesters during the first days created the impression that such division might not yet exist. But after the nationwide internet shutdown, the violent dispersal of protests, the unprecedentedly large number of killed protesters, and Pezeshkian’s announcements about the presence of ISIS members among the protesters, the chances of such division diminished.
Possible outcomes from the current crisis
After the Israeli and U.S. attack on Iran in June 2025, and the imposition of new economic sanctions on Iran, any wave of dissatisfaction arising from socio-economic grounds carries unpredictable consequences, because under conditions of external military intervention and tightening economic pressure, it will become increasingly difficult for Iran’s leadership to control social unrest. The fact that thousands of people were killed during protest suppression further complicates assumptions regarding the controllability of unrest.
At the same time, the threat of new military intervention remains high, taking into account both that Israel and the United States have not fully “solved” the problem they face (complete destruction of the nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, controlling Iran’s Middle Eastern policy), and that during the latest wave of protests in Iran, U.S. President Trump publicly promised to “help” the protesters. In American and Israeli circles, the discussion of the forms of “help” also includes the question of military intervention.
Under conditions of extreme internal tension and maximum external pressure, maintaining the status quo in Iran’s foreign policy and economic course becomes unlikely, and changes may develop in several directions. One possible direction is an internal but sharp transformation, transferring the balance of power in decision-making to the Government. In this case, there could still be an opportunity for Iran–U.S. dialogue, a new nuclear agreement, and steps to weaken the tightened economic pressure. In this scenario, a still sufficiently strong factor like the IRGC could become the most serious obstacle.
Another possible direction is the overthrow of the political regime through external military intervention, with the appointment of a transitional administrator. In this scenario, depending on the duration of the actions and the acceptance of the appointed administrator either nationwide or only in certain areas, it is possible to preserve the country’s territorial integrity, move to federal governance while preserving territorial integrity, or attempt to partition the country. At the current stage, all actors advocating transitional programs support maintaining territorial integrity, with only one proposing autonomy for Kurdish-populated areas.
It is also possible to achieve a new deal with the current administration, combining the nuclear program, ballistic missile policy, and regional politics along with questions of internal transformation of the country’s political system.
Impact on Armenia’s security
Iran’s internal instability and external confrontation pose significant risks for Armenia’s security environment. Iran, though not exclusively, has played an important role in restraining regional threats affecting Armenia, and weakening this factor could reduce Armenia’s strategic resilience.
Instability in Iran could also disrupt Armenia’s economic and logistical interests, endanger communication routes, and increase the risk of refugee inflows and humanitarian crises. At the same time, the new risk of military escalation further increases the potential impact of these risks.
Considering that there are several possible scenarios for the outcome of the current crisis, it can be argued that the greatest risk for Armenia may be the prospect of prolonged internal instability in Iran. Such instability could occur both with military intervention and without it.
If the crisis over the transfer of power is resolved in favor of the IRGC, and Iran continues its political future under additional isolation and new economic sanctions, this in turn will carry political risks for Armenia, whose entire history of independence reflects a history of avoiding using relations with the West and Iran against each other.
The best scenario for Armenia’s security and greater political-economic opportunities is an Iran that has normalized relations with the West. Whether such a perspective is possible under the current political system will depend on upcoming negotiations and Iran’s willingness to conclude a new agreement with the U.S.
Before reaching any outcome, however, the current tense situation itself already creates political risks for Armenia. The statement by Iran’s ambassador in Armenia, expressing dissatisfaction with Iranian protesters, is an indicator of the situation that, under maintained tension, conflicting parties — both inside Iran and at the international level — will increase the mutual effort to push Armenia to support one side. In all possible developments, maintaining neutrality while simultaneously not contradicting Armenia’s own democratic laws and adopted strategies will be Armenia’s main challenge in the near future.
Anna Davtyan-Gevorgyan
Researcher at the Center for Culture and Civilization Studies