Pashinyan’s Assertions and The Realities of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Final Battle

30/03/2026

 

 

On March 26, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that claims of fighting taking place in Artsakh on September 19, 2023, do not correspond to reality. He added that, according to Armenian intelligence, the lion's share of the weaponry in the arsenal of the NKR Defense Army was not utilized during the military actions of September 2023. Pashinyan did not specify which particular weapons were being discussed or the volume in which they were supposed to be used in any given direction.

 

Such statements from the Prime Minister require cold analysis rather than emotion—analysis rooted in military reality and the political conditions in which these events occurred.

 

The one-day war of September 19 is not about the question of "whether weapons were used or not." It is a question of blockade, resources, ammunition, air defense, the total dominance of the adversary, the absence of defensive fortifications, complex and vulnerable logistics, moral and psychological pressure, the lack of any hope for help, and political decisions made—including by the Prime Minister himself—long before the attack began. Meanwhile, the population remained captive to deceptive hopes regarding the Russian peacekeeping contingent and a fading faith in assistance from Armenia.

 

Any analysis of the events of September 19 must begin with the primary factor: the total blockade and complete isolation of Artsakh. The economy was paralyzed, the social system had collapsed, and the population lived under conditions of hunger and psychological pressure. This was a purposeful and systemic exhaustion prior to the military operation.

 

Demoralization inevitably affected not only the civilian population but also the army, which existed in conditions of uncertainty, a lack of strategic clarity, and limited resources. An army does not exist separately from society and depends on the quality of governance. It must be acknowledged: the political leadership and military command of Artsakh did not properly prepare to repel the aggression. It was precisely because of this failure at the managerial level that troops entered battle in a state of deep disorganization, with low levels of discipline and an absence of operational planning.

 

The Artsakh self-defense forces, vastly outnumbered and outmatched in every respect, were in extremely unfavorable conditions and inherently losing positions.

 

The stocks of certain types of weaponry were extremely limited. If one uses the intensity of the 44-day war as a benchmark, there was a critical shortage of ammunition required to sustain prolonged, intensive combat.

 

There is evidence that the artillery operated at its maximum possible capacity, based on the availability of ammunition on-site and the tactical situation. Even after the acceptance of capitulation demands, artillery crews in several sectors continued to expend their remaining ammunition. MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) were utilized, as were tube artillery and mortars.

 

Individual howitzers continued to fire even under active counter-battery fire from the Azerbaijani side. In several instances, the adversary was unable to accurately locate positions for a long time, which testifies to the professional work of the crews and competent camouflage. Artillery was not only used but fulfilled its tasks within the framework of available capabilities.

 

The issue of armored vehicle usage requires separate consideration. Modern warfare has shown that armor becomes an easy target for strike drones and precision-guided weapons. Under these conditions, deploying tanks to the line of contact would have meant their rapid destruction without any operational effect.

 

Nevertheless, there is substantial information that in certain sectors, tanks were used for fire support of the defending Armenian infantry. Infantry fighting vehicles were also used in local combat episodes. However, expecting that the use of armor would have created a breakthrough in the war—given the adversary's aerial dominance—was impossible. This contradicts the basic logic of modern warfare.

 

The most complex issue remains air defense. Yes, the air defense did not operate at full strength. Maintaining air defense systems in combat readiness was extremely difficult due to the conditions established after 2020, the adversary's round-the-clock monitoring of the territory, and the requirements of the peacekeeping contingent, which repeatedly relayed warnings from the Azerbaijani side regarding strikes in the event of defensive equipment deployment. Consequently, it is known that one "Tor" SAM system located in a hangar was destroyed by an Azerbaijani missile strike in the opening minutes of the attack; another was burned by its Armenian crew following the capitulation to prevent the vehicle's capture by the enemy.

 

The nature of the combat actions on September 19–20 itself deserves special attention. The use of anti-tank weapons and strike drones by Armenian forces refutes the thesis of a "lack of resistance." During the 24 hours of combat, significant losses for the Azerbaijani army were documented—more than 700 neutralized servicemen (205 killed and the rest wounded).

 

Azerbaijan did not suffer such daily losses during the 2020 war, nor during the aggression against Armenia in the fall of 2022. Losses are an objective indicator of the intensity of combat actions.

 

After the acceptance of capitulation, more than 100,000 Armenians left Artsakh, and the remaining weaponry and equipment passed under the control of the Russian peacekeeping contingent and the Azerbaijani side. In essence, the choice was between saving human lives and holding onto equipment and weapons left in warehouses. The second option implied only an increase in human casualties, with no chance of survival.

 

The war of September 19, 2023, was not a war in which "equipment was not used." The defeat was effectively predetermined; it was a consequence of the military defeat of 2020 and its aftermath.

 

Attacks on people who went through the hell of blockade and war, only to be left without a homeland, cannot be justified by political goals or election strategies. Attempts to shift responsibility onto the victims are, above all, immoral. They are also dangerous, as they substitute the work on national security with a search for internal enemies for the sake of holding onto power for another five years.

 

Eduard Arakelyan

 

The original was published on Civilnet.am.