Sustainable peace should not depend on election results: Tigran Grigoryan’s interview with Radio France International (RFI)

17/04/2026

 

Ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia, discussions about a possible war with Azerbaijan have resurfaced. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his closest allies describe the opposition bloc “Armenia” and the parties “Strong Armenia” and “Prosperous Armenia” as a “three-headed party of war,” warning citizens that if the opposition wins, a war could begin as early as September. The Russian-language service of RFI discussed with Tigran Grigoryan, Director of the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, the role of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations during the pre-election period and the progress of the peace process.

 

RFI: It has been more than eight months since the signing of the Washington Declaration. How is the implementation of the agreements progressing, and how are relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan developing?

 

Tigran Grigoryan: After the Washington summit, we entered a period of relative stability. This is the main outcome: talk of a new escalation has subsided, and overall the situation is fairly calm. The summit created a new atmosphere in the region. For example, Azerbaijan and Armenia have begun trading; Armenia buys gasoline from Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan has opened its territory for transit to Armenia from Russia and Kazakhstan.

 

Baku has its own motivation for such steps—its relations with the United States. In the early 1990s, amendments were adopted in U.S. legislation that, for example, hinder Washington from providing assistance to Azerbaijan. The main reason was the blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Now Azerbaijan is trying to show that there is no blockade and that Amendment 907 should be repealed.

 

As for TRIPP (Trump’s Route for International Peace and Prosperity), there were initially concerns that it might be a PR move by the Trump administration with no real process behind it. But these doubts faded when high-level American delegations began visiting the region. Last autumn, the U.S. side promised to allocate the first tranche of funding for TRIPP’s development. Before the U.S. Vice President’s visit, a technical team came to Armenia to assess the project’s feasibility. The process is ongoing.

 

There is also active legislative work underway, as the TRIPP implementation framework includes provisions for special purpose vehicle that did not align with Armenian law. As far as I know, progress in this direction has been quite successful.

 

A new factor is, of course, the war in Iran. This has somewhat slowed the process, though it has not stopped it entirely. The Armenian side has worked actively with Tehran to demonstrate that the project does not run counter to Iranian interests. To some extent, the Iranians have accepted this position. For example, Iran’s foreign minister stated that Iran’s “red lines” had been taken into account. However, risks have emerged related to the new Iranian elite, which may be more radical in opposing any U.S. presence in the region.

 

This is one side of the Armenia–Azerbaijan agenda. On the other hand, many unresolved issues remain. Armenian prisoners of war and political detainees are still being held in Baku. Azerbaijan continues to occupy territories of Armenia taken under control in 2021–2022. Azerbaijan also actively promotes the narrative of so-called “Western Azerbaijan” (an irredentist term referring to Armenia’s territory). Recently, another exhibition on this topic was organized. According to an OC Media investigation, this campaign is funded by Azerbaijan’s presidential administration.

 

Overall, there are positive trends—Armenia and Azerbaijan are trying to move forward along a path toward peaceful resolution. But if something does not suit Azerbaijan, it still has many levers and narratives it can use against Armenia.

 

How sustainable is this stability? On the one hand, Armenia’s authorities speak of achieving sustainable peace. On the other, they warn that if they lose the elections, this progress could be reversed.

 

Yes, there are serious contradictions here. Prime Minister Pashinyan and the ruling force present a picture to society that peace has already been achieved and is irreversible. It is clear why they say this: in 2021 they ran on a peace agenda. However, it is difficult to say that all promises made at that time have been fulfilled. Technically speaking, what was promised does not exist and cannot exist anymore. And more broadly, despite positive developments, a peace treaty has not yet been signed. Azerbaijan links its signing to the adoption of a new Armenian Constitution, and so on. Yet Pashinyan’s government is trying to present the Washington process and its aftermath as a fait accompli of peace.

 

At the same time, the prime minister effectively warns society: if we are not re-elected and do not secure a constitutional majority, there will be war. This raises a logical question: what kind of “sustainable peace” is it if its future depends not just on election results, but on specific parameters of those results?

 

Even if Pashinyan wins, the issue of adopting a new Constitution will arise. This is why the ruling party seeks a constitutional majority. The Constitution issue is unpopular and sensitive, with a widespread perception that changes are being imposed by Baku. The current conditions for adopting a Constitution are quite strict—for example, 600,000 people must vote in favor. This will be very difficult to achieve under current conditions. Therefore, they want a constitutional majority in parliament to lower these thresholds and then attempt to adopt a new Constitution.

 

So, it is probably premature to speak of sustainable peace. There is a period of stability, at least in the short term, which is certainly positive. What happens next—for example, after a change of administration in the United States, and whether new administrations will take TRIPP and other issues seriously—remains an open question.

 

Are there grounds for the authorities’ claims about plans to “revise peace”?

 

These statements are not serious. First, all opposition forces criticize the peace process and “Trump’s Road,” but none have stated that they would abandon these agreements if they came to power.

 

There are statements about optimizing these agreements. For example, the second president suggested extending TRIPP within Azerbaijan. Other forces speak of the need for additional guarantors of the peace process. But these are political statements with little connection to reality. Even if they come to power, Azerbaijan would not agree under any circumstances to a special simplified regime on its own territory. And the idea that Russia, the U.S., and China could become guarantors of the peace process, as proposed by Samvel Karapetyan’s party, is unrealistic under current geopolitical conditions.

 

All this is part of the political process—the opposition criticizes the ruling party. Presenting this as a threat to peace is not serious. Moreover, claims that everyone except the ruling party are “revanchists” may play into Azerbaijan’s hands and legitimize certain future actions.

 

This is also dangerous domestically. If you equate peace in the region with a specific party or leader and claim others are against it, you create grounds for anti-constitutional and anti-democratic measures. If elections determine not only who comes to power, but also the future of peace, democracy, or sovereignty, it becomes easy to justify overlooking democratic procedures or even the Constitution.

 

Are there actors who benefit from renewed conflict? Is Moscow uninterested in normalization between Yerevan and Baku?

 

Russian officials still say in official statements that many issues remain unresolved and seek to preserve their mediating role. But in reality, Russia lacks the leverage to stop this process. Negotiations are now largely bilateral. Russia has some influence but has not been inclined to use it.

 

I do not think Russia is actively trying to derail the peace process. Otherwise, we would have seen concrete actions after the Washington summit, where the U.S. achieved in a short time what Russia could not in five years. This is a sensitive issue for Moscow, especially after the ethnic cleansing in Karabakh and the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. The control over  “Zangezur corridor” had been considered as one of Russia’s key potential levers of influence. In this sense, Washington was a serious setback for Russia.

 

However, Russia has not taken active countermeasures. On the contrary, it has publicly welcomed the process and is using the new dynamics—for example, Russian goods now transit through Azerbaijan to Armenia. Russia is also interested in a stable land link with Turkey, which TRIPP could facilitate.

 

There is also the factor of relations with the Trump administration. With Trump, Moscow is trying to maintain a more cautious tone publicly, which is why we do not see harsh actions.

 

How is this rhetoric perceived within Armenian society? Is there polarization?

 

Not really. Another important factor is that the upcoming June elections are the first in Armenia’s history with a clear geopolitical dimension.

 

All major domestic actors have foreign policy preferences. The ruling party seeks closer ties with the West and reduced Russian influence. The opposition advocates restoring relations with Russia. External actors—the EU, the U.S., and Russia—also have preferences and attempt to influence the situation.

 

Public opinion differs significantly. Surveys show that Armenians favor a balanced foreign policy. Even among supporters of pro-Russian figures, many support EU membership. No group clearly supports alignment with just one power center.

 

Thus, polarizing rhetoric is mainly aimed at mobilizing core voters. For example, after Pashinyan warned of war, “Strong Armenia” responded that if he wins, there could be an economic war with Russia. These narratives aim to mobilize bases, but society largely does not accept them. Around 50% of voters do not support any political force.

 

How strong is the fear of war?

 

In the short term, it has decreased significantly. After the Washington summit, about 20% of respondents named escalation as their main concern, compared to over 40% before.

 

In the long term, nothing can be guaranteed. Azerbaijan is currently pursuing a more constructive path, but if demands—such as constitutional changes—are not met, it could frame this as Armenia’s unwillingness to pursue peace. However, this is more likely to result in a “no war, no peace” situation rather than full escalation.

 

What is the ruling party’s strategy?

 

Armenian society is tired of war. Even the most nationalist groups understand that Armenia is not in a position to fight another war.

 

Second, the ruling party’s 2021 promise was to usher in an era of peace. They are now trying to present the Washington process as that achievement.

 

There are also economic dividends. They argue that peace will open Armenia to international trade corridors and integration.

 

This constitutes a largely positive agenda.

 

The original interview can be found here.